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TOWARD A NORMATIVE CONSENSUS
AGAINST CORRUPTION:
Legal Effects of the Principles to Combat
Corruption in Africa
ALHAJI B.M. MARONG*
INTRODUCTION

In February 1999, eleven African countries adopted a set of twentyfive principles as a framework for combating corruption in Africa, and
in the continent's dealings with the outside world.' The negotiations
were held under the auspices of the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), a
Washington-based intergovernmental policy forum dedicated to
building consensus on development policy and priorities among African
governments and their partners in development.
The principles,
referred to here as the "Anti-corruption Principles," address corruption
in international business transactions, and in development assistance
to Africa.
The "Anti-corruption Principles" followed on the heels of anticorruption efforts in other regions of the world, particularly as they
relate to the international business transactions. Notable efforts in this
regard include the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
concluded by Member States of the Organization of American States in
1996, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in

* LL.B (Hons.) Univ. of Sierra-Leone (1992), B.L Sierra-Leone Law School (1993), LL.M
McGill University (1997), D.C.L Candidate, McGill University. Formerly Senior State
Counsel at the Attorney-General's Chambers, Banjul The Gambia, and Legal Adviser to
the National Environment Agency of the Gambia. I would like to thank Stephen Toope,
Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Karamo Sonko, and Aileen Marshall, all of whom read previous
drafts of this article and provided useful comments. Any errors, omissions and
shortcomings remain mine alone.
1. The eleven participants were: Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali,
Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. Some of Africa's partners in
development including Canada, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, the United States, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) were present during the negotiations. See Global Coalition for
Africa, Past Activities, 25 Principles to Combat Corruption, at http://www.gcacma.org/epastact.htm.
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International Business Transactions that was adopted in 1997.2
Earlier, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Declaration
against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial
Transactions.3
In this paper, I argue that since the 1970s, the international
community has engaged in a discourse over corruption and its effects on
the international economy and national societies. In some regions of
the world, this discourse generated sufficient common understandings
of the relationship between economies and corruption, and gave rise to
legal norms to combat corruption. Both the OECD and Inter-American
Conventions are outcomes of this set of discursive processes. On the
other hand, except for their involvement with the processes within the
United Nations General Assembly and the Centre for Transnational
Corporations, African countries failed to take a regional initiative to
combat corruption before 1997. That year, the issue was addressed as
the main theme of the GCA Policy Forum in Maputo, Mozambique.4
Since then, a specific African discourse on corruption is identifiable,
taking place under the auspices of the GCA, and culminating in the
adoption of the Anti-corruption Principles. More recently, efforts to
fight corruption in Africa commenced at the sub-regional level. In May
2001, West African Ministers of Justice issued a Declaration in Accra,
Ghana, calling upon the Secretariat of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) to elaborate a comprehensive Protocol
on Corruption.5 The Ministerial Declaration recognized the significance
of the issue when it stated "corruption is not only a criminal issue but

2. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724
[hereinafter OAS Convention]. The Convention was signed by 21 Latin American
Countries, as well as the United States and Canada in 1996. It entered into force on
March 20, 1997. See also the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18 1997, Arg.-Braz.-Bulg.-ChileSlovk., 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
3. G.A. Res, 51/191, U.N. GAOR, 51' Sess., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1043 (1997). The
United Nations concern with corruption goes back to 1974 with the establishment of the
Center for Transnational Corporations (CTC), which was intended, inter alia, to negotiate
a Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. As part of this process, an Ad Hoc
Intergovernmental Working Group on the Problem of Corrupt Practices was established
in 1976, and renamed in 1978 as the Committee on an International Agreement on Illicit
Payments. The Committee agreed on a draft International Agreement, which was
forwarded to ECOSOC and the CTC for inclusion in the Code of Conduct, but was not
adopted. The draft U.N. Code of Conduct on TNCs was also not adopted. See Draft U.N.
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Commission on Transnational
Corporations, 17' Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/6 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 192
(1983).
4. See 1997 Political Committee Meeting, Maputo, Mozambique, at http://www.gcacma.org/epoli.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2000). The issue had surfaced earlier in 1995 at
the Global Coalition for Africa Meeting in Maastricht, Switzerland.
5. The Guardian (Lagos), Ecowas Justice Ministers Move Against Corruption (June
5, 2001), at http://allafrica.com/stories/200106050180.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2000).
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also impacts on the dynamics of national and international development
that deserve collective solution ....
It is my argument that the discourse on corruption within the
United Nations, and the various regional organizations, has generated
shared understandings of the negative impacts of corruption on the
economic and development objectives of nations and people. It also
illustrates the emergence of an international normative consensus
against corruption. This consensus represents the emerging opinio
juris sive necessitatis of the international community, thus, the
beginning of the process of formation of a customary international law
on corruption.
Remarkably, the processes associated with the
development of the African Anti-corruption Principles involved
participation by an array of actors including states, international
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and individuals.
Arguably, this inclusive process engendered a perception of legitimacy,
which, in turn, explains the increasing influence of the Anti-corruption
Principles.7
Thus, by adopting the Anti-corruption Principles, African countries
have joined the process of formation of an emergent customary norm.
The implication of this situation is that if African countries fail to
conclude a Convention Against Corruption as envisaged by Principle 25
of the Anti-corruption Principles, the current emerging opinio juris,
together with supporting State practice, could form the basis of a
regional customary law on corruption.8 As such, governments would be
under an obligation to take domestic measures to prevent their
nationals (including legal persons), from engaging in corrupt activities
in their dealings with officials of other countries.
Despite this argument, it is suggested that a regional convention on
corruption would be the preferable regulatory option for Africa. Yet,
6. The Guardian (Lagos), Ecowas Justice Ministers Move Against Corruption (June
5, 2001), at http://allafrica.conrstories/200106050180.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2000).
7. See discussion infra at notes 34-38 and accompanying text as well as notes 85-102
and accompanying text. The concepts of perceived legitimacy and process fairness are
borrowed from Thomas M. Franck. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS 16 (1990); See also THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 25 (1995).
8. The International Court of Justice in the Asylum Case laid down the idea of a
regional custom. The Court stated the requirements of this type of custom as follows:
The Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this
custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on
the other Party ....
The rule invoked... [must be] in accordance with a
constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question, and that
this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to [one] State and a
duty incumbent on the[other] State.
Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276 (Nov. 20). See also Rights of Passage over
Indian Territory (Port. v. India) 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12), see infra note 451 and
accompanying text.
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even a convention would have little practical effect if African nations do
not put in place adequate institutional and legal mechanisms at the
domestic level to fight corruption. The lesson to be learned is that an
effective strategy against corruption would require linkages between
mutual operation of institutional and legal mechanisms at both the
regional and national levels. There is no doubt that much depends on
the effectiveness of domestic implementation measures such as: (1) the
reform of many criminal laws or the enactment of new legislation that
could be effectively enforced; (2) reform of public institutions to
introduce greater accountability in the public sector; (3) political
leadership that is more than rhetorically committed to fight corruption;
(4) a general public that is intolerant of fleece, an engaging civil society
to probe and reveal cases of corrupt practices; (5) an enabling
environment for the free expression of public opinion; and (6) an
independent judiciary. In effect, in many ways adherence to the rule of
law is crucial to effectively fight corruption.!
DEFINITION AND HYPOTHESIS

There is broad agreement that corruption is the "abuse of public
office for private gain."'0
This definition focuses on the public or
9. Edward Kwakwa, Regulating the International Economy: What Role for the
State?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 227, 242 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
10. Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption:The Facts, FOREIGN POL'Y, June 22, 107, 114

(1997); See also Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption in Economic Development: Beneficial Grease,
Minor Annoyance, or Major Obstacle?, at http://www.worldbank.orgwbi/governance/pdf/
wei.pdf. This definition is shared by many organizations, including the World Bank and
Transparency International. See WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT
CORRUPTION: PROGRESS AT THE WORLD BANK SINCE 1997 16 (2000), available at
http'J/www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/helpingcountries.pdf
(last visited Apr. 20, 2002); See also JEREMY POPE, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
SOURCE BOOK 2000-CONFRONTING CORRUPTION: THE ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL
INTEGRITY SYSTEM 13 (2000), available at http'//www.transparency.org/sourcebook/
sourcebook.pdf.zip (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). A similar definition is inferable from the
Global Coalition for Africa's 1997 policy statement on corruption. See Policy statement,
Global Coalition for Africa, Corruption and Development in Africa, GCA/PF/N.2/11/1997,
available at http'J/www.gca-cma.org/epfdoc97.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2002) [hereinafter
GCA]. The same definition is implied by the OECD and the OAS Conventions. See W.
PAATI OFOSU-AMAAH ET AL., COMBATING CORRUPTION: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF
SELECTED LEGAL ASPECTS OF STATE PRACTICE AND MAJOR INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES
70-75 (1999). W. Paati Ofosu-Amnmah and his coauthors offer a more elaborate, but less
inclusive, definition of corruption centered around the notion of bribery. Based on a study
of major legal systems of the world that address corruption, they conclude that an act of
corruption is consummated:
whenever a public officer or other agent accepts or solicits a bribe, or any
person gives or promises a bribe to such a public officer or other agent;
provided.., that the purpose of the bribe is to serve as a reward to the
public officer or agent for an act that he has done or refrained from doing in
the exercise of his functions, or as an inducement designed to ensure that the
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governmental sphere, particularly, on the extent to which government
involvement in the national economy provides opportunities for public
officials to engage in rent-seeking behavior, often at the expense of
government policy and public welfare. However, the definition does
convey the misleading impression that corruption is unidirectional,
rather than a two-way phenomenon. Every act of corruption involves at
least two parties. Public officials are in many cases on the demand side,
but their crime is no less than those, who pay bribes, or offer and induce
the acceptance of other special treatment."
The focus on the public sector corruption is nonetheless justified by
statistical evidence, which, inter alia, demonstrates a correlation
between the extent of the government involvement in the economy, and
the amount of corruption. For example, the results of a 1996 survey of
two thousand enterprises across forty-nine countries showed a higher
incidence of corrupt practices in countries with more regulatory and
bureaucratic requirements for business.' In addition, there is evidence
that the more administrative discretion officials enjoy in approving
regulatory requirements such as the issue of permits, licenses, or grants
of the fiscal exemptions to business, the more the likelihood of
corruption.1 3 According to Wei:
The more discretion government officials have over the operation of
business or lives of citizenry, the more likely corruption would occur
and flourish... labyrinthine government regulations create fertile
grounds for government officials to extract rents, whereas an economy
4
where government's role is minimal is less likely to breed corruption.
It is true that the exercise of official discretion could in many
respects be abused leading to corruption. Common sense, therefore,
dictates that public policy must seek to limit the extent of
administrative discretion officials enjoy, so as to reduce opportunities
However, while this may provide a strong case for
for abuse.
streamlining the role of the state in the economy in certain cases, and
for the privatization of inefficient and monopolistic state enterprises,
the state continues to have important socio-economic roles to play in
poor developing countries, especially those in Africa.' 5 In the area of
public officer or agent does, or refrains from doing any act, in the exercise of
his functions.
OFOSU-AMAAH ETAL., supra note 10, at 63.

11. See infra text accompanying note 24 for a discussion of the role of the
international economic processes in increasing corruption in developing countries.
12. Kaufman, supra note 10, at 119. His calculations were based on data compiled by
the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 1996.
13. See GCA, supranote 10.
14. See Wei, supra note 10, at 16.
15. See Kwakwa, supra note 9 (for a discussion on the continuing relevance of the
state in governing the international economy, especially in developing countries); See also
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corruption, the state, represented by political leadership and public
sector elite, continues to have a crucial leadership role to play. Thus,
instead of disengagement of the state from the economy, what Africa
needs are more responsible and accountable governments, and a public
sector committed to advancing the national socio-economic agenda.
Greater public-sector responsibility and accountability will contribute
not only to economic development, but also to the fight against
corruption.
Having said that, it must be noted that improper exercise of public
authority is not the only explanation for corruption in Africa. Other
factors include the structure of public services, particularly the systems
of recruitment, promotion, and compensation.
In many African
countries, recruitment and promotion processes are distorted in favor of
friends, family, and political allies. There is little doubt that this has
had a negative effect on the quality and capacity of manpower that end
up in official positions. Moreover, the levels of remuneration are so
poor compared to the private sector, that many officials are tempted to
make up for the shortfall by demanding bribes before discharge of their
official functions, for the issue of regulatory permits, or for the offer of
government construction and procurement contracts. Inadequate or
inefficient legal structures for the investigation, detection and
prosecution of corrupt practices also contribute to the upsurge of this
menace.
Consequently, a meaningful anti-corruption strategy in Africa will
require a mix of administrative restructuring and legal reform
measures. These reforms could be complemented by honest political
leadership dedicated to the fight against corruption, and through
programs of public education so as to develop an "anti-corruption
sensibility" among the general population.1 6 Among other factors,
exemplary leadership and civil society pressure have been credited with
the success of 1anti-corruption
efforts in Hong Kong, Singapore, Uganda
7
and Botswana.
In his study of the development problems in Nigeria, Umez
recognized that previous studies had proffered three main explanations
Oscar Schachter, The Erosion of State Authority and its Implications for Equitable
Development, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE 31 (Friedl Weiss et
al. eds., 1998).
16. On political leadership at the national level, see Augustine Ruzindana, The
Importance of Leadership in Fighting Corruption in Uganda, in CORRUPTION AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 133-145 (Kimberly Ann Elliot, ed., 1997). On the importance of
exemplary leadership at the local government level, see ROBERT KLITGAARD, ET AL.,
CORRUPT CITIES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CURE AND PREVENTION (2000) (narrating.the
experiences of former Mayor Ronald Maclean-Abaroa of the city of La Paz, Bolivia). I use
the phrase 'anti-corruption sensibility' to describe a general aversion to corruption on the
part of the citizenry.
17. See GCA, supra note 10, at 22-24.
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for that country's lack of development:
(1) the colonial legacy
explanation; (2) the corrupt leadership hypothesis; and (3) the
authoritarian regimes argument. 8
In his view, although these
explanations are part of the picture, they do not tell the whole story.
For Umez, a more profound and compelling explanation for Nigeria's
development problems is the prevalent value system, which "glorifies
and endorses corrupt and illegal means as necessary, normal, and
sufficient means to ends." 9 Consequently, that value system ought to
be addressed in any assessment of Nigeria's development problems, and
must be reflected in any sustainable strategy to address those
problems. The importance of public education to the eradication of the
"prevalent value system," and its replacement by anti-corruption
sensibility among the population, cannot be overemphasized.
The question of the prevalent value system in Nigeria raises the
broader issue of the relationship between traditional practices of
hospitality or gift giving and corruption. In many African cultures, gifts
are an integral part of norms of hospitality and represent symbols of
appreciation.2" This noble tradition of gift giving has unfortunately
been used as an excuse for corrupt payments to developing country
officials mainly by Northern business concerns on the pretext that it is
normal business practice within the recipient cultures.2 1 Nothing, of
course, is further from the truth. Corruption is not a part of any culture
anywhere, definitely not in Africa. General Olusegun Obasanjo, twotime President of Nigeria, has drawn a fundamental distinction
between African cultural norms of hospitality and gift-giving on one
hand, and the deliberate manipulation of that practice for selfish
personal enrichment. 2 Thus, while it is true that in many African
18. BEDFORD N. UMEZ, THE TRAGEDY OF A VALUE SYSTEM IN NIGERIA: THEORIES AND
SOLUTIONS (1999).
19. Id. at 37-45.
20. See GCA, supra note 10, at 6.
21. See Jeremy Pope, Containing Corruption in International Transactions-The
Challenge of the 1990s, in ISSUES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: PAPERS WRITTEN FOR THE
COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 71 (1995).
... Now when you're talking about kickbacks, you're talking about
something that's illegal in this country, and that, of course, you wouldn't
dream of doing .... But there are parts of the world I've been to where we
all know it happens. And if you want to be in business, you have to do - not
something that is morally wrong ....
In many countries in the world the
only way in which money trickles down is from the head of the country who
owns everything. Now that's not immoral or corrupt. It is very different from
our practice. Id. (quoting the views of former British Cabinet Minister Lord
Young over BBC radio).
22. Id. at 72 (quoting a Letter from Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo to the Financial Times
of London (Oct. 14 1994)):
In the African concept of appreciation and hospitality, a gift is a token; it is
not demanded; the value is in the spirit of the giving, not the material worth.
The gift is made in the open for all to see, never in secret. Where a gift is
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countries wealth and social status are uncritically accepted, even in
situations where the persons' earnings are demonstrably inconsistent
with their lifestyle, there is no basis for the assertion that corruption is
morally or legally permissible in these societies.
In addition to the domestic factors, the international economic
processes have also played a role in the increasing corruption in
developing countries. The globalization of the international economy
has facilitated greater movement of persons and capital across borders.
Multinational investors, mainly from developed countries, frequently
pay bribes to officials of developing countries in order to win
government contracts, licenses, permits, and concessions. They argue
that such bribes are necessary to speed approval processes, and in some
cases, to secure market presence, which would otherwise be secured by
the less efficient and less scrupulous competitors.2 What is more, home
states of multinational investors have bought these arguments. Except
for the United States, which outlawed bribery of foreign officials since
1977, other OECD countries not only allowed illicit payments by
investors, but also made such payments tax deductible.2 There is little
doubt that this state of affairs encouraged investors to pay, and
developing country officials to demand and receive bribes."5 In light of
the above, the ratification and implementation of the 1997 OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, is significant.26
excessive it becomes an embarrassment, and is returned.... If anything,
corruption -as practiced by exporters from the North as well as by officials in
the South- has perverted positive aspects of this age-old tradition.
23. See Kaufmann, supra note 10, at 115-117 (stating the 'speed money' and 'grease
the wheels' theses and a demonstration of their weaknesses); See World Bank, World
Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World 103, at
http://www.worldbank.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2002) (refuting the 'speed money"
argument); See also Transparency International, TI Source Book 2000, (2000), available
at http//www.transparency.orgsourcebook/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2002)
(rejecting the claim that corruption leads to efficient resource allocation).
24. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.S § 78dd-1 (2001).
25. Patrick Glynn et al., The Globalization of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 7-27 (Kimberly Ann Elliot, ed., 1997) (especially at 16, where they
make the following point: 'Many developed states not only legally permit such bribery but
also permit firms to deduct such bribes as a legitimate business expense. This is not only
a widespread and pernicious instance of corruption but also a practice by which the
industrial nations, in effect, encourage and contribute to corruption in the developing
world.")
26. Article 1 of the Convention criminalizes bribery of foreign public officials, Article
2 provides for liability of legal persons, and Article 3 provides sanctions including
.effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties," and the seizure and
confiscation of the proceeds of bribery, or property equivalent thereto. Article 8 calls on
States to adopt within the framework of their laws and regulations, accounting and
auditing standards, and financial statement disclosures, 'to prohibit the establishment of
off-the-books accounts, the making of off-the-books or inadequately identified
transactions, the recording of non-existent expenditures.., for the purpose of bribing
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Having identified the factors that broadly explain the rise in
corruption in developing countries, it is pertinent to outline its effects
on the developing country's economy, and society. As already noted, one
of the early arguments proffered as a justification for corruption in
countries with excessive bureaucratic and regulatory requirements, is
that the bribery of officials works to "speed the wheels of commerce,"
and so has an overall positive effect on the economy, because it
facilitates more investment. 27 This "grease the wheels" or "speed
money" thesis has now been largely discredited. Empirical research has
shown that bribery of officials to secure government approval for
business, operates both as an adverse incentive to potential investors,
and does not really speed up the approval process.
On the contrary,
survey data from two thousand four hundred firms, in 58 countries,
show that those corporate managers, who pay more bribes, on average,
spend more time negotiating with their conspirators in government,
than managers that pay fewer bribes.' Kaufmann cites the case of a
senior Indian civil servant who not only failed to speed the approval
process for the company that bribed him, but also offered his services to
rival businesses to slow the process down for them." The implication is
that the "speed money" hypothesis is clearly flawed.
With respect to its effects on the economy, there is evidence that
investors view bribery as a private tax on their investment, and tend to
shy away from jurisdictions with high rates of "private taxation."3 1 In
other words, bribery increases the transaction costs of doing business in
particular jurisdictions. The effect has been lower inflows of foreign
investment to countries with high rates of corruption. Indeed, Mauro's
analysis shows a negative correlation between the amount of corruption
and the level of investment in a country.2 It further shows that a
country that improves its standing on the corruption index by one

foreign public officials or of hiding such bribery." See Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, arts 1-3,
8 S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43, 1997 U.S.T. LEXIS 105. While a liberal interpretation of
this provision may require Parties to outlaw tax deductibility, the provision as it stands,
falls short of the expected express requirement to prohibit tax deductibility of illicit
payments.
27. David H. Bayley, The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation, 19 WESTERN
POLITICAL QUARTERLY 719 (1966) (arguing that corruption has positive effects on
developing economies).
28. See Wei, supra note 10, at 13-14.
29. See id. at 14.
30. See Kaufinann, supra note 10, at 117.
31. Paulo Mauro, Why Worry About Corruption?,in ECON. ISSUES at 6 (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Economic Issues, No. 6), availableat http'//www.imf.org/externallpubs/ft/issues6/
issue6.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2002)..
32. See id. at 9 (where he writes that" Regression analysis indicates that the amount
of corruption is negatively linked to the level of investment and economic growth, that is
to say, the more corruption, the less investment and the less economic growth.")
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standard deviation (on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is the most corrupt
and 10 the least corrupt), will experience an increase in its rate of
investment by about four percentage points.3 Similarly, Wei examined
data of foreign investment flows from fourteen source countries to fortyone host countries in the 1990s, and concluded that there was clear
evidence that corruption discourages foreign investment.
Using a
number of statistical corruption indices (to rank countries according to
their levels of corruption), the author concluded that if, for example,
India was to reduce its corruption level to that of Singapore (in a
ranking where Singapore was perceived to be the least corrupt country),
the effect would be equivalent to reducing its rate of corporate tax by up
to 22 percent.
Corruption has also been found to slow economic growth. In his
study referred to earlier, Mauro further concluded that the
improvement by one standard deviation in a country's corruption index
would translate to an annual growth rate of over half a percentage
point in per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
It is important to
note that in both the Mauro and Wei studies, the statistical relationship
between corruption and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and economic
growth is valid across all regions. Thus, even though the locus of their
research is not Africa, their conclusions remain significant, and have
important implications for African countries.
One of the causes of corruption identified earlier is the structure of
developing country public services, particularly their selection and
promotion processes, as well as their low wage scales. In addition to
distorting the human resource capacity, this factor has led to
distortions of both public policy and government expenditure.
Corruption-prone public servants often customize government policies
in developing countries to facilitate receiving bribes or other illicit
payments, rather than in accordance with the needs and aspirations of
the people. Thus, government policy and expenditure are prioritized
towards capital-intensive infrastructure, defense, and cognate "supplytype" contracts that offer opportunities for rent-seeking and kickbacks,
instead of socially desirable and needed health, education, and public
welfare projects. 3 Moreover, even these projects are often delivered in
substandard quality, necessitating further expenditure within a short
period of time on either maintenance, or new projects. 39 The result is
33. Paulo Mauro, Why Worry About Corruption?, in ECON. ISSUES at 6 (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Economic Issues, No. 6), available at httpJ/www.imf.org/external/pubs/ftlissues6/
issue6.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
34. See Wei, supra note 10, at 9.
35. See id. at 6-7, 10.
36. See Mauro, supra note 31, at 9.
37. See Kaufmann, supra note 10, at 120.
38. Id. at 118.
39. Vito Tanzi & Hamid Davoodi, CORRUPTION, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, AND GROWTH 7,
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that the living conditions of the poor in these already poor societies
worsen, with little opportunity for advancement.
Corruption has also resulted in a significant diversion of public
funds, from both internal revenue, and external development
assistance. Figures for Gambia for the early 1990s estimate that
"customs and tax revenues amounting to 8-9 percent of GDP were
foregone, largely as result of corruption."4 0 In 1994-95 fiscal year,
revenues in Tanzania were reported to have dropped dramatically as a
result of corruption by revenue officials.4'
The above research has important policy and legal implications for
Africa. Lagging behind most regions of the world in terms of flows of
FDI and the rate of economic growth, and leading the world in rates of
poverty, disease, unemployment, and general lack of development,
Africa is the region that can least afford the economic costs of
corruption. For Africa, the fight against corruption deserves similar
attention and priority as accorded to other issues that threaten the
development of the continent such as HIV/AIDS, environmental
degradation, poverty, war, and undemocratic governance. In other
words, it is an imperative development challenge. The GCA has put
this point succinctly, "Corruption in Africa is a development issue."
African countries cannot bear the costs of corruption, which impedes
development and minimizes the ability of governments to reduce
poverty. For these reasons, effectively addressing corruption in African
countries has become a development imperative.'4 2
FACING THE CHALLENGE: THE

GCA

ADDRESSES CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

The issue of corruption first surfaced in GCA deliberations in 1995,
when several delegates brought it up at the 1995 Plenary Session of the
Organization held in Maastricht.43 It quickly gained prominence, and
there was agreement that it should be given more attention within the
GCA." As a result, it was assigned as the main subject of the 1997
GCA Policy Forum held in Maputo, Mozambique."' Initial efforts were
directed at reducing bribery in the international procurement,
especially in donor-financed projects and contracts. 6 For this purpose,
8, 15, 17-18, 20 (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper, No. 97/139, 1997), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp97139.pdf (last visited Oct. 1997); See also
Kaufmann, supra note 10, at 118; See Wei, supra note 10, at 11; Mauro, supra note 31, at
10, 11.
40. See GCA, supra note 10, at 11.
41. See Jeremy Pope, supra note 10, at 15.
42. GCA, supra note 10, at 2.
43. See id. at 1.
44. Id.
45. GCA, supra note 10, at 2.
46. Id. at 2.
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a new GCA initiative was launched with a three-pronged approach: (1)
African Heads of State would prohibit their officials from receiving
bribes from international procurement contracts; (2) the heads of
international companies bidding on contracts would certify that their
servants and agents were barred from offering or paying bribes; andd
(3) international financial institutions would be requested to include "no
bribery" clauses in contracts that they finance.47
In order to maintain momentum, the GCA embarked on an
inclusive and participatory process of consensus building that saw input
from African and international non-governmental organizations,
African parliamentarians, governments, and development partners. In
addition to bribery in procurement contracts, the issues for debate were
also broadened to include corruption in development assistance and in
international business transactions generally.48
The broad-based
participation was due to a realization on the part of the GCA and the
participating governments that a successful anti-corruption strategy
will require broad coalitions among African governments, civil society
and the international community. It was this process that culminated
in the 1999 Washington meeting at which the Anti-corruption
Principles were announced.4 9
At a recent GCA Policy Forum held in Abuja, Nigeria, attended by
twenty-three African governments, including three heads of state,
development partners, parliamentarians, mayors, non-governmental
organizations, and the private sector, most participants expressed their
agreement with the Anti-corruption Principles and expressed the
willingness of their respective governments to endorse and implement
them. 0 It is my argument that the adoption of the principles, as well as
subsequent follow-up and endorsement by governments, demonstrates
an emerging normative consensus that may provide the basis for the
development of regional customary law on corruption.51 When the
47. GCA, supra note 10, at 2. There is no indication of the extent to which this
initiative has been successfully implemented.
48. Id. at 3.
49. Global Coalition for Africa, Corruption, Collaborative Frameworks to Address
Corruption, at http://www.gca-cma.orglecorrup.htm#1098 (last visited Feb. 23, 1999)
[hereinafter Principles to Combat Corruption].
50. Global Coalition for Africa, Meetings, Report on the 2000 Policy Forum, at
http://www.gca-cma.org/epolicy.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2002). The Policy Forum, which
was attended by the author, was held from October 19 to 21 in Abuja. The African
countries represented were Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote
d'Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia,
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia. Among the
development partners in attendance were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.
Also present were the World Bank, the IMF, the European Commission, and the UNDP.
See Global Coalition for Africa 2000 Policy Forum List of Attendees (on file with author).
51. On the requirements of local custom at international law, See Rights of Passage
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regional consensus
parts of the world,
result is arguably
corruption. In the
formation of a rule

is considered along with legal developments in other
particularly, among the OECD and OAS states, the
the emergence of international customary law on
next section, I will discuss the requirements for the
of custom in the international law.
CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW

Under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, the principal sources of international law are listed as
conventions, custom, and general principles of law." The Article also
provides that judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified
publicists are subsidiary sources of the international law.53
While the validity of the above categories as sources of
international law cannot be gainsaid, a sophisticated understanding of
the process of contemporary international law making, reveals that the
Article is inadequate in important respects. First, the provision was
negotiated and concluded by a small, largely homogenous group of
Western countries.'
Since the end of the Second World War, the
structure of the international legal order has changed significantly,
with a new majority of developing countries with widely varying
priorities and challenges from those of the western powers. This new
dynamic called for a corresponding evolution of the law making
process.5
Attempts by the new States to effect this change in
Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12). "The Court sees no reason
why long continued practice between two States accepted by them as regulating their
relations should not form the basis of mutual rights and obligations between the two
States. . ."; See also Asylum, supra note 8, and accompanying text.
52. Statute of the International Court of Justice (59 Stat. 1055 1945), U.S.T.S. 993,
art. 38.
53. Id.
54. See KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-5 (1993) (a useful
account of the negotiating history of this provision, especially the role of what she calls
"the Great Power Jurists"). The Advisory Committee of Jurists that was appointed by the
Council of the League of Nations to prepare the establishment of the Permanent Court of
International Justice were appointed in an independent, personal capacity. By "Great
Power Jurists" the author means jurists from the powerful industrialized countries like
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, who exercised no mean
influence during the negotiation and drafting of the Statute.
55. The most candid expression of this situation was made by Michael Reisman in the
context of a discussion on the legal status of soft law:
The rapid growth of soft law and complaints about it are, in large part, a
concern of developed countries.
Part of it has to do with the deep
dissatisfaction that we feel at the shift of power within formal lawmaking
arenas, in which we are in a numerical minority. We discover that many of
these fora make law we do not like. This law, we insist derisively, is soft.
This may be a valid complaint, but those who are making this soft law also
have a valid complaint. From their perspective, customary law, which we
would consider very hard, is in fact law that is created primarily because of
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international law making were largely resisted by the West.56 Secondly,
alongside the emergence of new states, there has also been a
proliferation
of international
organizations,
non-governmental
organizations, and other non-state actors, most of them playing
significant roles in influencing international lawmaking." As Toope has
commented:
...the latter part of the twentieth century has been marked by the
emergence of a wider variety of actors seeking to shape the evolution of
international law. It may now be safely argued that international
organizations, international non-governmental organizations, groups
claiming self-determination, individuals, and even "epistemic
communities" shape international law through their influence within
institutionalized processes of discussion....

the great power that we in the industrial world exercise over others. There
are really two sides to the controversy over soft law. It is important when we
criticize it, to appreciate that there are others on the other side of the mirror
who are looking at it quite differently.
See W. Michael Reisman, A Hard Look at Soft Law, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of
American Society of International Law, (Apr. 20-23, 1988), in A.S.I.L. PROC. at 377.
56. The most prominent example of this was the developing country argument that
resolutions and declarations of the United Nations General Assembly are potentially
creative of international law. It was in pursuance of this argument that the instruments
of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) were said to lay down new customary
rules. These instruments were the United Nations Declaration on a New International
Economic Order, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and the
Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Together, they were also
argued to have laid the foundation for the customary law right to development. These
arguments were strongly opposed, and ultimately muted by most western countries, who
clung to the traditional conception of international prescription laid down in Article 38 of
the ICJ Statute.
57. Stephen J. Toope, Redefining Norms for the 21' Century, in CAN. COUNCIL ON
INT'L L. PROC. 191, 197 (1995). The work of the United Nations and its Specialised
Agencies, and that of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in
the environmental field could be cited as examples. The IUCN not only influences the
international agenda for environmental lawmaking, it has on several occasions, either
solely, or with other organisations, provided soft law instruments and draft treaties for
negotiation by states. Examples include the 1980 World Conservation Strategy, which
was revised and renamed in 1991 as Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable
Living. It prepared an Earth Charterthat was intended for, but not adopted by the 1992
UNCED Conference. Either singly, or in collaboration with other organizations, the
IUCN worked on the following treaties: the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International
Significance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (RAMSAR), the 1972 World Heritage
Convention, the 1973 CITES Convention, the 1979 Migratory Birds Convention, and the
1992 Biodiversity Convention. The Global Coalition for Africa provides a similar forum
for international discourse on issues of development facing Africa. On the role of non-state
actors in international economic governance, See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the
Global Economy through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 177-205

(Michael Byers, ed., 1999).
58. Toope, supra note 57, at 197; See Peter M. Haas, Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic
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Handl also supports the view that states no longer enjoy exclusive
competence in international lawmaking, "[a] statist view of
international law.., is difficult to reconcile with a multitude of
nonstate transnational actors who, as a sophisticated legal process
analysis would show, now have had a significant impact on
international law." 59
Having said the above, the inadequacies of Article 38 need not
delay us further. This paper has a more limited objective than a
deconstructionist attack on traditional sources doctrine. Other scholars60
have ably done that, and the interested reader may refer to them.
Since the principal argument of this paper is that the conclusion of the
Anti-corruption Principles marks the beginning of the process of
formation of a regional customary law on corruption, I will focus on the
requirements for a rule of customary international law to exist.
Under subparagraph 1 (b) of Article 38, custom must be evidenced
in a "general practice accepted as law."6 ' Thus, two elements must be
present in order for a rule of law to qualify as one of customary law:
there must be general state practice, together with a conviction on the
part of states that such practice is required by law - the opiniojurissive
necessitatis.62 It is the latter element that distinguishes legally relevant
custom from mere habit, usage, social practice, or public policy. 6 In
other words, opinio juris is what confers on state practice what Toope
has called a distinct "concept of legal normativity."'
In the Asylum

Communities and MediterraneanPollution Control, 43 INT'L ORGANIZATION 3, 377-403
(1989); See also Peter M. Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons:Epistemic Community
Efforts to Protect the Stratospheric Ozone, 46 INT'L ORGANIZATION 1, 187-224 (1992)
(discussing the role of epistemic communities in international environmental lawmaking).
59. Gunther F. Handl, A Hard Look at Soft Law, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law (Apr. 20-23, 1988), in A.S.I.L. PROC. at 373;
See also K-C. Wellens & G.M. Borchardt, Soft Law in European Community Law, 14
EUR.L.REv. 267 (1989).
60. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989); PHILIP ALLOTr, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A
NEW WORLD 298 (1990); See also Philip Allott, Language, Method and the Nature of
InternationalLaw, 1971 BRIT.Y.B.IN'L L 79; See also Toope, supra note 57.
61. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 52.
62. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (1999) [hereinafter BYERS]; See also
WOLFKE, supra note 54, at 41-45.
63. ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, 27 (9h
ed. 1993). They draw the following distinction:
"A custom is a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions which has
grown up under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are, according
to international law, obligatory or right. On the other hand, a usage is a
habit of doing certain actions which has grown up without there being the
conviction that these actions are, according to international law, obligatory
or right." Id.
64. See Toope, supra note 57, at 195.
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Case, the International Court of Justice described the requirements of
custom as "a constant and uniform usage, accepted as law." 65 These
requirements have now been accepted as applicable to general customs
as well.'
Similarly, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the Court, in
considering whether State practice since the conclusion of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, had been such as to
amount to a new rule of customary international law said:
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they
must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of
a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of
a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris
sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they
are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency,
or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are
many international acts, e.g. in the field of ceremonial and protocol,
which are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only
by considerations of
courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any
67
sense of legal duty.
The two-pronged requirement has been eloquently referred to as
the "bipartite conception of customary international law."6 Several
writers have criticized this bipartite conception. Byers refers to it as a
"chronological paradox" requiring that when states create new
customary rules, their acts must be based on a prior belief that those
rules already exist. 69 In his view, this conception would make it
impossible for new customary rules to develop. 0 Wolfke calls it a
"reverse sequence," arguing that "one cannot accept what does not yet
exist."7'
She points out that the element of acceptance does not
necessarily have to come after the practice; the two could, and do often
happen simultaneously."2 For Akehurst, the traditional approach seems
to require that states must believe that something is "already law
before it can become law."13 In the words of D'Amato, "if we can say that
a state is acting in accordance with its conviction that it is acting in
conformity with prevailing international law, then by implication we
65. See Asylum, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
66. ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 233
(1971) [hereinafter CONCEPT OF CUSTOM].
67. North Sea Continental Shelf (Austl. v. Fr., N.Z. v. Fr.) 1969 I.C.J. 3, 35 (Feb. 20).
68. See BYERS, supra note 62, at 130.

69. Id.
70. See id. at 131.
71. See WOLFKE, supra note 54, at 64.
72. See WOLFKE, supra note 54, at 64.
73. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of InternationalLaw, 1974-75 BRIT.Y.B.
INT'L L. 32 (emphasis added).
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already know what that international law is ... if we know the law,
then there is no further need to cite the "evidence" of the state's actual
practice in conformity with that law."74 In addition to the sequencing
problem, subparagraph 1(b) also turns the order of things on its head,
for it is practice that is evidence of custom, and not the other way
round.
While there seems to be an agreement on the state practice and
opinio juris as constitutive elements of customary international law,
there is little consensus on the character of each element. At one end of
the spectrum are a group of scholars who argue that only the positive
acts of States count as state practice, and not their statements, claims,
or other verbal postulates.75 At the other end, are those who adhere to a
broader conception of state practice to include not only positive acts, but
also failures to act, statements, treaty ratifications, negotiating
positions as evidenced in travaux prdparatoires,votes for or against
resolutions, and declarations in international fora.76
Both the
International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission
seem to support this more inclusive view of state practice."
A middle ground could also be identified. According to Byers, the
inclusive conceptualization of state practice to include both acts and
statements would make it difficult to determine whether the
psychological element of custom exists in any given situation. 78 From

74. See D'AMATO, supra note 66, at 73.
75. The leading proponent of this theory of state practice is Anthony D'Amato. In
1971, D'Amato wrote inter alia, that:
... in their disputes with their counterparts, national decision-makers
manifest a preference for having their acts cited against them rather than
their prior statements or expressions of will. For a State may say many
things; it speaks with many voices... But a State can act in only one way at
one time, and its unique actions, recorded in history, speak eloquently and
decisively."
D'AMATO, supra note 66, at 51. For other adherents to this restrictive view of state
practice, see WOLFKE, supra note 54; See also Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. 3,
199 (Dec. 18) (J. Read).
76. See Akehurst, supra note 73, at 10; See also Ian Brownlie, Comparative
Approaches to the Theory of International Law, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of
American Society of International Law (Apr. 9-10, 1986), in A.S.I.L. PROC. at 154, 156
(where he implicitly refers to D'Amato and Wolfke's view as "Rambo" superpositivism,
and noting that they are in a minority on the issue).
77. In the Asylum Case, the Court relied both on 'official views' (statements) and
treaty ratifications (acts) in coming to a conclusion whether the alleged rule of customary
law existed. In the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v.
U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 200 (Aug. 27), the Court relied on diplomatic correspondence as evidence
of state practice. The International Law Commission's (ILC) position is that treaties,
decisions of international and national tribunals, national laws, diplomatic
correspondence, and the opinions of national legal advisers are all possible forms of State
practice. See [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.Comm'n 368-372.
78. See BYERS, supra note 62, at 136.
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the perspective of the "inclusionists," the only evidence of opinio juris
available will, at the same time, be State practice, despite the
requirement of a separate psychological element to distinguish legally
relevant from irrelevant State practice.79 The result, in Byers' view, is
"an epistemological circle, which renders one or the other element of
customary international law redundant."0
It is to avoid this
epistemological circle that he suggests a different conception of opinio
juris as a shared understanding among states about the legal relevance
or irrelevance of state practice."1
With the possible exception of the New Haven School and the work
of Thomas Franck, many early scholars relied on opinio juris to
distinguish legally relevant from irrelevant specific rules.2 On the
other hand, Byers focused on the process of customary law formation.83
As process, Byers argues that customary law involves a "collective
knowledge" or a set of shared understandings."
Viewed from that
perspective, "opiniojurismay then be understood as being those shared
understandings which enable States to distinguish between legally
relevant and legally irrelevant State practice."85
79. See BYERS, supra note 62, at 136.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 148.
82. Propounded by Harold Lasswell and M.S. McDougal, and developed by W. M.
Reisman and his associates, the New Haven School is also process oriented. They view
international lawmaking as a constitutive process of international decision involving the
communication of three messages: 'policy content' (the prescription), 'authority signal'
(basis of legitimacy to prescribe), and 'control intention' (the power to enforce or make
effective). The New Haven School recognizes that lawmaking involves the interaction of
states and non-state actors. See Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process
of InternationalDecision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1966-67); Myres S. McDougal and W.
Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Process: How
InternationalLaw is Made, (1980) Yale Studies in Public Order, 249; see W. Michael
Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, Address at the Annual
Meeting of American Society of International Law (Apr. 24, 1981), in A.S.I.L. PROCS., at
101; see also W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International
Law, (Apr. 2, 1992), in A.S.I.L. PROC., at 118. Thomas Franck also distinguishes between
substantive and procedural fairness in international law, arguing that the latter is
determined by meeting the requirements of process legitimacy, which, according to him,
are determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence. See Franck supra note 7.
83. See BYERS, supra note 62, at 148.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 150. Byers makes the following compelling critique of the traditional
position on opiniojuris:
Opiniojuris,when defined in terms of a belief on the part of States that they
are acting in accordance with pre-existing or simultaneously developing legal
rules, does not seem particularly helpful, either as a practical tool for
determining the existence of customary rules, or as an explanation of how
those rules arise. In contrast, shared understandings appear to be most
significant in the domain of the process of law creation rather than at the
level of individual rules. It is the process of customary international law
which best represents the conjunction of behavioral regularities and
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Byers' use of shared understandings to discuss the emergence of
opiniojuris is both novel and insightful. However, he largely leaves the
reader to speculate on how such understandings come into existence.
This may in part be explicable on the basis of his reliance on three
realist assumptions about international relations: (1) that states are the
predominant actors at the international level; (2) that consent is the
only basis upon which states can be bound by rules of international law;
and, (3) that states act more or less out of self-interest which they
promote through applications of power.86 This emphasis on statism and
on consent as the basis of state obligation is the evidence of positive law
thinking on Byers' work. His invocation of shared understandings
differs from their use by constructivist international relations scholars
for whom shared understandings emerge from practical reasoning and
the use of rhetoric among states and other international actors in the
course of international relations.
The concept goes back to the
Aristotelian notion of topoi (commonplaces), which serve as seats of
argument for the development of further norms.
A process approach to the problem of customary international law
is both attractive and useful. For present purposes, it enables the
analysis to proceed without having to determine whether particular
acts or statements should be considered as state practice, whether a
rule must be expressly claimed to be of a norm-creating character, or
that it must be articulated as such in order to qualify as a rule of
customary law. 88 Rather than focusing on the legal status of specific
rules, the analysis proceeds from the point of view of the process of
customary law formation. As it is argued in detail later, both the
legitimacy and influence of legal rules are significantly conditioned by
the processes through which they come into existence. 89

convergent expectations. BYERS, supra note 62, at 150.
86. Id. at 13-14.
87. FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS
OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING

IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC

AFFAIRS 39 (1989) (discussion on shared understandings and their historical connection to
Aristotle); See also infra text accompanying note 116.
88. On the concept of articulation,see D'AMATO, supra note 66, at 73-82. According to
his theory, for a putative rule to qualify as customary norm, every act must be backed up
by an 'articulation" of international legality. Thus, articulation is the psychological
element that qualifies specific instances of state practice as customary law. This theory
while elegant, has limitations, the most obvious being that rules of customary law often
develop without any express ascription of legality to them. In other words, opinio juris
need not be express, it could take the form of a latent or underlying consensus.
89. See supra note 26.
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A Note on State Practice'
There is large and growing evidence of state practice in support of
anti-corruption measures in Africa. Some of these measures go back to
the period immediately following decolonization, and form a part of the
newly independent states' efforts to set their economies on the path to
growth. A review of domestic anti-corruption measures reveals two
main legal strategies. First, many countries have enacted specific anticorruption legislation that typically provides for the establishment of a
governmental agency with powers of investigation, prevention and
prosecution of corruption. 91 Provision is also made for declarations of
assets and business interests by political leaders and other public
servants, as well as issues of self-dealing and conflicts of interest.9 For
example, the Kenyan law not only set up the Anti-Corruption Authority
with powers of investigation and prosecution, but also provided for
security of tenure and freedom of political interference for the head of
the Authority."
Secondly, other countries have included anti-corruption provisions
in their national constitutions.
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana
probably represents the most comprehensive approach."
The
Constitution requires the State to "take steps to eradicate corrupt
practices and the abuse of power."95 All public servants must declare
their assets and liabilities to the Auditor-General upon their
appointment, to update such declarations every four years, and at the
end of their term of office.' Such declarations are admissible evidence
before a court of law or other tribunal. Any property contained in the
declaration that is not attributable to a legitimate source, is presumed
90. This section is based extensively on W. PAATI OFOSU-AMAAH ET AL, see supra note
10.
91. See Kenya's Prevention of Corruption Act 1965 (established the Anti-Corruption
Agency); Uganda's Leadership Code (Act No.8) of 1991; Tanzania's Public Leadership
Code of Ethics (No. 13) of 1995; See also Mozambique's Ethics Law 1998.
92. See Constitution of the Federal Government of Nigeria, Schedule 5, Part 1,
(1999), at http://nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm (which
provides a code of conduct for public officers). Under the code, officers are prohibited from
placing themselves in a position where their personal interests would conflict with their
official duties or responsibilities; several senior public servants including the President
and his Cabinet, Commissioners of State governments, and members of the National
Assembly, are prohibited from holding external bank accounts; public servants are
prohibited from receiving gifts in the course of their duties, except where they can prove
that such gifts were of a customary nature, given on special occasions. Moreover, sections
149, 152, and 185 of the Constitution require various government officials to declare their
assets before assuming office).
93. W. PAATI OFOSU-AMAAH ET AL, supra note 10, at 44.
94. Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana (1992), available at
http'/www.ghanareview.com/Gconst.html.
95. Id. at art. 35.8.
96. Id. at art. 286(1).

2002

PRINCIPLES TO COMBAT CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

to be acquired in contravention of the constitution." Finally, Chapter
24 of the Constitution provides a comprehensive code of conduct for
public officials in Ghana. 98
Constitutionally guaranteed anti-corruption provisions can also be
found in the 1995 Constitution of Uganda which utilizes the concept of
trusteeship as the basis of the relationship between public officials and
the general public." Thus, public officers are accountable to the people
for the discharge of their official functions, and the State shall take "all
lawful measures.., to expose, combat, and eradicate corruption and
abuse or misuse of power" by public officials." ®
The common feature of these anti-corruption drives is the
establishment of specific institutions to deal with corruption at the
domestic level.'0 ' On a less positive note, what is also common among
most of them is that the laws and institutions have not succeeded in
eradicating, or in some cases even reducing, corruption in public office.
While both Uganda and Botswana are hailed as African success stories
in the fight against corruption'N and General Obasanjo's second rule in
Nigeria have been credited with making progress in a society where
corruption has been historically endemic,0 3 African countries have little
The most recent
else to show for their fight against corruption.
97. Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana (1992), supra note 94, at art. 286(4).
98. See W. PAATI OFOSU-AMAAH ET AL, supra note 10, at 12. They cite Article 284 (on
general conflicts of interest), and 286 (5) prohibiting officials of public corporations or
authorities from serving as Chairmen of the Governing Boards of such bodies. The
provision applies to the President and all Members of Cabinet and Parliament, the
Speaker and his Deputy, the Chief Justice and Judges of the Superior Court of
Judicature, Ambassadors, and other senior civil servants. For a full listing, see
Constitution of Ghana, supra note 94, at art. 286(5); See also W. PAATI OFOSU-AMAAH, ET
AL, supra note 10, at 88-89.
99. Constitution of Uganda, Article XXVI (1995), at http://www.government.go.ug/
constitution (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
100. Id. at art. XXVI (iii); See also W. PAATI OFOSU AMAAH ET AL, supra note 10, at 12.
101. Kenya established her Anti-Corruption Authority since 1965; in Tanzania the
Prevention of Corruption Act (1993) made provision for the establishment of the
Prevention of Corruption Bureau; in Ghana the Serious Fraud Office Act (1993)
established the Serious Fraud Office; in Botswana the Corruption and Economic Crime
Act set up the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime; and in Malawi, the Corrupt
Practices Act (1995) also established the Anti-Corruption Bureau.
102. GCA, supra note 10, at 21-22.
103. Tunku Abdul Aziz, Vice Chairman of Transparency International, Speaking in
Malaysia, June 2001:
Relief from the IMF and increases in aid funding are evidence that the poor
ranking of Nigeria in the CPI is recognized internationally as an inheritance
that cannot be overturned in the space of one or two years. The Nigerian
administration has also made great strides in its quest to recover funds
looted by the late dictator Sani Abacha.
Press Release, Transparency International, The Corruption Perceptions Index 2001
at
available
2001),
27,
(June
2-3
Countries
91
Ranks
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2001/cpi200l.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2002).
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evidence of this can be found in Transparency International's
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2001, which revealed that five of
the ten countries perceived as being the most corrupt in the world, can
be found in Sub-Saharan Africa including some of the apparent success
stories. '
While the CPI may not be the most accurate measure of
corruption, (for example it does not reflect campaign finance
contributions) it does indicate that for developing countries especially
those in Africa, the problem is broader than corruption simpliciter; the
misuse of public trust and confidence that has become characteristic of
African leaders and public sector employees, is in reality a governance
problem that needs to be addressed in a holistic, rather than spectoral
manner.
T

As I argued in the first part of this paper, legislative and
institutional reform measures alone are insufficient to eradicate
corruption in Africa. Political leaders, civil servants, the press, civil
society, and the general public all have important and increasingly
complementary roles to play. Apparently, political leadership and
public support were crucial for the relative success of the anticorruption efforts in both Botswana and Uganda.'05
Yet, unless
governmental
structures
are reformed
to introduce greater
responsibility and accountability, and the rule of law is entrenched as
the fundamental norm of behavior in African societies, corruption will
continue to eat away at the very fabric of our societies.
Moreover, as African countries become increasingly integrated in
their economies, and into the larger global economy, single-state efforts
to combat what is in effect a global problem, are unlikely to be very
successful.
The massive movement of investment capital across
national boundaries means that there are increasing opportunities for
public officials to benefit from corrupt payments. It equally provides an
opportunity for regional and international cooperation to fight
corruption, particularly in international business transactions.
Corruption provides another issue area for which the Westphalian
conception of state sovereignty poses a challenge to the need for
cooperation among states. It requires a merger of sovereignties across
regional and international levels in the common interests of all
01 6
countries and people. Arguably it is of common concern to all nations.
104. See Press Release, supra note 103, at 3-4. Under this year's CPI, Botswana
ranked as Africa's least corrupt country, with Tanzania, Cameroon, Kenya, Uganda, and
Nigeria being perceived as the five most corrupt countries respectively. This year's index
also shows that many of the 55 countries that scored less than 5 were also among the
poorest in the world. The CPI measures perceived public sector corruption i.e., among
public officials and politicians. Countries are allocated a score ranging from 10 to 0, the
higher score indicating the least degree of perceived corruption.
105. See GCA, supra note 10, at 22-23.
106. The principle of 'common concern of humanity' came in as a counterpoise to 'state
sovereignty' on the basis of which international society was organized since the Peace of
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For these reasons, it is my suggestion that in addition to the
consensus reflected in the Anti-corruption principles, an African
Convention on Corruption could provide the legal basis for regional
cooperation to combat corruption within the continent, as well as serve
as a mechanism for cooperative efforts with other regions of the world.
Such regional and international cooperation is consistent with the
global nature of the corruption problem.
BEYOND CUSTOM: TOWARD HORIZONTAL PROCESSES OF NORMATIVE
DEVELOPMENT

Adopting a process approach to the development of the
international legal norms, it is my argument that customary norms
emerge from the interaction of States in the international society, and
between States and non-state actors like international organizations,
non-governmental organizations, and even individuals. 7 The distinct
features of this interactive approach are, first, a multiplicity of actors
participating in the process of norm generation alongside states.0 8

Westphalia in 1648. It recognizes that even though states are sovereign and equal and
enjoy exclusive competence over matters within their territorial jurisdiction, there are
certain matters for which the whole international community has an interest in
preserving. In their advisory opinion in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd.
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, the International Court of Justice placed international laws
prohibiting aggression, genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination among the category of
obligations that were owed to the international community as a whole - they are erga
omnes obligations. More recently, the common concern principle has been most commonly
invoked in the field of environmental protection. The 1992 Biodiversity and Climate
Change Conventions both provide that the preservation of the world's biodiversity as well
as protection of the world's climate system, are common concerns of humanity. See
Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M 818, 822 (preamble); see also
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849, 851 (preamble);
see Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25) (the International
Court cited with approval the view of the International Law Commission that
safeguarding the earth's ecological balance is an essential interest of all states). For
commentary on the principle of the common concern, see ALEXANDRE C. KISS & DINAH
SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, 22-24 & 250-254 (2d ed. 2000).
107. This explanation of the customary process is in some respects analogous to that of
the New Haven School referred to above, supra note 82. The New Haven School
recognizes that states are no longer the exclusive participants in international
lawmaking, which includes "participants formally endowed with decision competence...
and all those other actors who, though not endowed with formal decision competence, may
nonetheless play important roles in influencing decisions." Thus it is from the interaction
of these multiple participants, that international law emerges. See supra note 82.
108. See Toope, supra note 57, at 197:
... the latter part of the twentieth century has been marked by the
emergence of a wider variety of actors seeking to shape the evolution of
It may now be safely argued that international
international law.
organizations, international non-governmental organizations, groups
claiming self-determination, individuals, and even 'epistemic communities'
shape international law through their influence within institutionalized
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Second, international legal norms emerge from a variety of fora of
interaction (both formal and informal), in contrast to the hierarchical
structures of courts, legislatures and executives within the domestic
sphere. 1" Third, law emerges from processes of institutional discourse,
what Brunn6e and Toope call "institutionally shaped rhetorical
practices, and acceptances of reasoned argument."11 An interactional
explanation of normative development reveals that there exists a large
body of international legal norms for which compliance is not explicable
on the basis of the existence of a sanction or other coercive force.
Consistent with the horizontal nature of international society, and the
dearth of centralized decision-structures on the domestic law model,
alternative explanations must be sought for the persuasive power of
such legal norms.
Inspired by the work of Lon Fuller, Brunn~e and Toope argue that
the influence of legal norms is a function of their perceived legitimacy.'
Legitimacy in turn is induced by adherence to an "internal morality" of
rules, and to weak tests of "external morality.""
In proposing an
interactional theory of international law, they emphasize key elements
of normative development at the international level. First is the
mutually generative character of international legal norms, i.e. the
involvement of an array of state and non-state actors in the

processes of discussion....
109. See McDougal & Reisman, supra note 82, at 26. "The situations of interaction
and communication are both official and non-official, organized and unorganized. The
organized
situations
include familiar
diplomatic,
parliamentary
diplomatic,
parliamentary, adjudicative, and executive arenas and all situations are characterized by
differing degrees of institutionalization, temporal duration, geographic range, and
expectations of crisis." See also Reisman, supra note 82, at 122.
110. Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism:
Elements of an InteractionalTheory of InternationalLaw, 39 COLuIM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19,
51 (2000) [hereinafter "InternationalLaw and Constructivism"].
111. Brunnee & Toope, Supra note 110, at 51-52 ("Law is "authoritative", but only
when it is mutually constructed and, for that reason, legitimate").
112. The concepts of internal and external morality come from Fuller. He laid down
eight tests of internal morality applicable to both individual rules and legal systems.
They are generality, promulgation, non-retroactivity, clarity, non-contradiction,
possibility, constancy over time, and congruence of official action with underlying rules.
There is no requirement that all these tests must be present in conjunction in order to
meet the requirement of legitimacy. While the tests of internal morality relate to the
manner of bringing rules into existence, and to their application ( i.e. processes), external
morality relates to the substantive ends that law seeks to achieve, for example fairness,
equality and justice. Fuller also seems to imply that legality is primarily a function of
internal morality, i.e. that the pursuit of substantive outcomes would only make sense
once the existence of law is ascertained through adherence to internal morality. In view
of the pervasive interaction of ends and means implicit in interactionist thought, law that
adheres to internal morality would invariably also meet the requirements of external
morality. The upshot is that the tests of legality remain primarily those of internal
morality. The foregoing is based on the reading of Fuller contained in InternationalLaw
and Constructivism,supra note 110, at 54-57.
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development of norms, as well as the mutual construction of actors and
This element
the institutions within which actors socialize.1
distinguishes the interactional model from hierarchical explanations of
international lawmaking. By arguing that law is the product of social
engagement by a multitude of actors in a variety of formal and informal
settings, interactionism provides a more appropriate depiction of
processes of normative development at international law than both
positivism and the policy science approach." 4 Interactionism also
provides justification for recognition of the increasing influence of nonstate actors, whether corporations, non-governmental organizations,
issue-oriented groups, epistemic communities, government networks, or
individuals in international lawmaking."'
The second element of the interactional theory is the role of
rhetorical knowledge in generating "behavioral expectations" or "shared
understandings" that serve as seats of argument for the development of
This element recognizes what Fuller calls the
further norms."6

113. See InternationalLaw and Constructivism, supra note 110, at 48. It is partly
through this mutual conditioning of actors and structures that interaction is said to affect
not only behavior, but also actor identity. In the process of socialization, actors utilize
rhetorical knowledge as an instrument of persuasion. It is largely through processes of
socialization, and the employment of reasoning by analogy (rhetoric), that shared
understandings emerge from actor interaction. Institutions in which such socialization
takes place, therefore, serve as centers of learning by states and other actors.
114. The "Policy Science approach," more commonly known as the New Haven School
of international law, also recognizes that law emerges from patterns of interaction among
a diversity of actors including those 'formally endowed with decision competence', as well
as those not so endowed, and that there are various sites of normative interaction, both
formal and informal. As is apparent from the foregoing discussion, interactionists share
these same non-hierarchical conceptions of normative development in international law.
However, whereas the New Haven School is instrumentalist in orientation - the pursuit of
human dignity being its ultimate objective- the interactional model does not seek to
promote any particular value system. On the contrary, it calls for the incorporation of
'plural cultural influences' into the evolution of legal norms. On more specific differences
between interactionism and the New Haven School, see International Law and
Constructivism, supra note 110, at 24-25. For a non-exhaustive list of sources on the New
Haven School, see supra note 82. For a critique of the New Haven School, see Phillip 1.
Trimble, InternationalLaw, World Order and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV.
811 (1990); See also Toope, supra note 57.
115. Toope, supra note 57, at 197; On the role of government networks, see Slaughter,
supranote 57.
116. On the notion of law as rhetoric, and of legal reasoning as a particular aspect of
practical reasoning see KRATOCHWIL, supra note 87, at 39. Kratochwil also makes
reference to the Aristotelian concept of 'topos' or 'topoi' (commonplaces) in the context of
practical reasoning. In what he calls a 'discourse on grievances', topoi operate in several
choice situations including instances of both political and legal decision-making. In the
former context, they operate as 'seats of argument', helping to identify starting-points,
and in building consensus. In the context of legal reasoning/argument, rules of procedure
and evidence (juridical topoi) serve as basis for exclusion of facts and items of proof, and
as aids to judicial decision-making. It is worth noting, as Brunnde and Toope did, that
Kratochwil's analysis is limited to the context of judicial lawmaking. Hence, despite his
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'entrepreneurial' character of lawmaking: that is, that the development
of law and legal systems is an ongoing, hence incomplete, project. 117 As
such, legal development straddles along a continuum from the pre-legal
or "contextual" stage to binding normativity."8 Legal principles or
interstitial norms serve as important instruments of change and
development in this continuum."9
The implication of adherence to an internal morality, and
particularly the element of mutual generation, is that by involving a
diverse set of actors in the development of legal norms, actors develop a
sense of ownership of emergent norms. This quality of acceptance in
turn introduces a perception of legitimacy. Rules that are perceived as
legitimate thus exercise a compliance pull of their own. 20
It is here that the interactionist theory meets with the work of
Thomas Franck. In proposing a theory of legitimacy at international
law, Franck posited that legitimacy is "a property of a rule or rulemaking institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on
those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the
rule or institution has come into being or operates in accordance with
generally accepted principles of right process.""' The elements of this

express disavowal of legal positivism, the structure of his analysis shows a strong
positivistic underpinning. See also Friedrich V. Kratochwil, How Do Norms Matter?, in
THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (Michael Byers ed., 1999). See also Toope, supra note 57, and
accompanying text.

117. See International Law and Constructivism, supra note 110, at 45-57; contra
Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm
Generation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW at 209 (Michael Byers ed., 1999),
[hereinafter Politics], arguing that the international legal system is 'practically complete'.
See also FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 7, at 4-6,
arguing that international law has entered a post-ontological era, a mature and complex
legal system that provides for all types of relationships and interactions at the
international level. I suppose that both Lowe and Franck would not deny that despite its
practical completeness and maturity, international law remains an evolving phenomenon.
118. Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater
Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 26 (1997) (explaining regime
evolution as a continuum from the pre-legal or "contextual" stage, to binding normativity).
119. On the role of interstitial norms as agents of change and development in
international law, see Vaughan Lowe, Sustainable Development and Unsustainable
PAST
Arguments, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 19-37 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone eds.,
1999); See also Politics, supra note 117, at 207-226. Lowe's argument however limits the
role of interstitial norms to the context of judicial decision-making, arguing that the
principle of sustainable development operates in the context of judicial decision to
reconcile the operation of primary norms where the latter are likely to conflict in their
application. This restriction to judicial decision, is evidence of positive law influence on
Lowe's thesis.
120. See THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS, supra note 7, at 16.
121. Id.
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process legitimacy are determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and
adherence."' These elements generally merge into the interactionist
tests of internal morality. m However, whereas for Franck, legitimacy is
an attribute of right process, tests of internal morality as propounded
by Fuller and applied by the interactionists, "are genuinely moral, not
mere desiderata of coherence or logical soundness."12" Thus for the
interactionists, law's ends and means stand in a relationship of
"pervasive interaction."
Mutual generation, as a process value,
introduces greater acceptance of norms by participants in the process of
normative generation, and increases their commitment to substantive
outcomes."
In effect, for both Franck and the interactionsists, the
method by which norms come into existence has a bearing on their
influence in international society. For the former, norms that meet the
tests of process legitimacy exercise a compliance pull of their own."'
For the latter, when the tests of internal morality are met, norms will
be perceived as legitimate and would attract "their own adherence."127
While not seeking to apply their respective theses, my arguments
are influenced by some elements of both process legitimacy and
interactional theory. In particular, I adhere to the view that inclusive
processes of normative generation have a bearing on the degree of
compliance with, or influence of a norm.
I argue that as an
international
organization, the GCA provided a forum for
institutionalized discourse and interaction of African governments and
a variety of actors on the issue of corruption in Africa. That discursive
process led to the adoption of the Anti-corruption Principles. The
traditional sources doctrine would categorize the Principles as a nonbinding (soft-law) instrument. Whatever their characterization under
sources doctrine, the adoption of the principles represents the startingpoint on a continuum of normative development that may culminate in
the emergence of a customary law on corruption in Africa, or the
adoption of a regional convention to combat corruption, or both. In
their present form, the Principles could be viewed either as shared
understandings among African governments and other actors involved
in their development, as an emerging opinio juris, or as representing
the pre-legal or contextual stage of normative development in this issue
area.128

122. For an accessible treatment of each of these elements, see FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 7, at 25-46.
123. The only difference appears to be Frank's requirement of "symbolic validation."
See InternationalLaw and Constructivism, supranote 110, at 53.
124. See InternationalLaw and Constructivism, supra note 110, at 53.
125. InternationalLaw and Constructivism,supra note 110
126. See FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 7, at 26.
127. See InternationalLaw and Constructivism, supra note 110, at 56.
128. I do not claim that these pre-legal categorizations are always mutually exclusive
or chronological. Michael Byers for example, has suggested that in view of the difficulties
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Hence even in their present state, the Anti-corruption Principles
are not without normative value. They could provide inspiration to
governments to adopt anti-corruption legislation at the domestic level,
provide the basis for negotiation of a regional Convention on Corruption
thus contributing to the progressive development of international law,
serve as an instrument of moral suasion for public officials,
corporations, and international organizations, and a tool in the arsenal
of civil society in providing a check against governmental excess and
the abuse of power.
INCLUSIVE PROCESSES OF NORM BUILDING: NEGOTIATING THE ANTICORRUPTION PRINCIPLES

The African Anti-corruption Principles were the outcome of a
diffuse discursive process that brought together States, international
organizations, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and
individuals. As part of the preparations for the 1997 GCA Policy
Forum, African Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) met in
Nairobi, Kenya, and adopted a Statement for submission to States
when they meet at the Policy Forum. 29 The NGO Statement recognized
that corruption erodes the moral fabric of society, that it is a violation of
the social and economic rights of people, and undermines
development. 130 It expressly called on African States to co-operate in
the adoption of a regional Anti-corruption Convention, and to take
effective domestic measures to fight against corruption.13' Among the
measures suggested are the establishment of anti-corruption
commissions with power to investigate and prosecute cases of
corruption, the maintenance of judicial independence and adherence to
the rule of law, reform and restructuring of African public services and
improvement of their terms of service, streamlining the role of
inherent in the concept of opiniojurisand to avoid an 'epistemological circle', opiniojuris
should be properly understood as shared understandings which enable states to
distinguish between legally relevant and legally irrelevant state practices. See BYERS,
supra note 62, at 148. Brunne and Toope also suggest that under an interactionist view,
the existence of law should be measured by the influence it exerts, and not by a rule's
provenance from any given hierarchical source. Thus, 'sources of law' could be understood
as shared understandings which could be invoked depending on their adherence to tests
of internal, and to a limited degree, external morality. See International Law and
Constructivism, supranote 110, at 65.
129. See Global Coalition for Africa, GCA Collaboration with the Civil Society, NGOs,
Parliamentarians, the Private Sector and Others, Statement of African NGOs on
Corruption, availableat http://www.gca-cma.orgengo.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2002) (the
NGOs met from 23-28 October 1997 in Nairobi, Kenya. The GCA Policy Forum was held
from 1-2 November 1997, in Maputo, Mozambique).
130. Global Coalition for Africa, GCA Collaboration with the Civil Society, NGOs,
Parliamentarians, the Private Sector and Others, Statement of African NGOs on
Corruption, availableat httpJ/www.gca-cma.org/engo.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2002)
131. Id.

2002

PRINCIPLES TO COMBAT CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

government in the economy, and transparency in government
procurement and contracting procedures.1 3'2 The fact that a number of
these recommendations found their way into the Anti-corruption
Principles illustrates the influence the NGO statement had on the
deliberations of the States. 3'
In addition to the separate NGO meeting held in Nairobi, non-state
actors also participated in all GCA Policy Forums that addressed the
issue of corruption. As already indicated, this was the case with the
meetings held in Maputo in 1997, and in Abuja in 2000.134 The Anticorruption Principles not only resulted from this diffusive discursive
process, but the involvement of a diverse group of stakeholders in GCA
deliberations has continued to give legitimacy to the principles.
In the Anti-Corruption Principles, African States expressed concern
about the effects of corruption on the social, economic and political
foundations of nations, as well as on their socio-economic development
and poverty alleviation efforts.
It was recognized that an effective
anti-corruption strategy would require a combination of domestic
measures, and regional and international collaboration.'36
At the domestic level, several measures are necessary to create an
enabling environment for the fight against corruption. These include
political will and leadership that is itself committed to the ideal of a
corruption-free society, good governance and the institutionalization of
democratic rule,'37 the rule of law and independence of the judiciary,'
civil service reform," 9 as well as re-evaluation of the role of the State in
the economy."4 ° It is only against this background that specific anticorruption measures like the establishment of anti-corruption
agencies,' and the enactment of anti-corruption legislation can be
effective.'
In addition, governments would need to put in place an
enabling legal and administrative environment that permits input from
non-state actors like NGOs, the free-press, and individuals. For these
reasons, the Anti-corruption Principles make provision for the
participation of the public and of civil society in anti-corruption

132. Global Coalition for Africa, supra note 130.
133. See Principles to Combat Corruption in Africa, supra note 49.
134. See id.
135. Id. at preamble.
136. Id. at principles 13-17, 19-25. See also GCA, supra note 10, at 1.
137. See Principles to Combat Corruption in Africa, supra note 49, at preamble.
138. Id. at principle 17.
139. Id. at principle 6.
140. Principles to Combat Corruption in Africa, supra note 49, at principle 3. See also
the discussion on p. 6 supra, on the continuing relevance of the state in developing
economies, particularly those in Africa.
141. See Principlesto Combat Corruption in Africa, supra note 49, at principle 13.
142. Id. at principle 4.
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programs,"' and for rights of access to information about corruption
through, inter alia, protection of press freedom. 1"
The interaction of states and non-state actors in the process of
developing the Anti-corruption Principles exemplifies the contemporary
dynamic that the process of normative evolution in international law is
no longer the exclusive domain of States. When one adopts a conception
of norms that analyses their legitimacy not on the potentiality of
enforcement, but on the inclusiveness of the process of normative
creation, it becomes apparent that a norm generated through broadbased participation of various international actors commands greater
persuasive
power
and
a greater potential
for
successful
implementation.1 4 5
According to Brun6e and Toope, "[riules are
persuasive and legal systems are perceived as legitimate when they are
rooted in thick acceptance by the citizenry...
Arguably, it is the
inclusive process that characterized the development of the Anticorruption Principles
that explains their increasing endorsement by
147
African States.
CONCLUSION

The burden of this paper has been to argue that there is an
emerging normative consensus against corruption among Africa States.
This consensus resulted from a distinctive African discourse on
corruption that took place under the auspices of the Global Coalition for
Africa, with participants drawn from a number of African governments
and non-governmental actors, as well as Africa's development partners.
I argued that the inclusiveness of this discursive process engendered a
perception of legitimacy that in turn explains the increasing popularity
of the Anti-corruption Principles.
Arguably, the Anti-Corruption
Principles represent an emerging opiniojuris among African states that
may evolve into rules of customary law. In the alternative, they could
be viewed as shared understandings among African states and other
participants in the discursive process about the corruption issue, or as
the pre-legal or contextual stage of normative development in this issue
area. Whichever way they are characterized, what is important is that
the Principles represent the starting point of a continuum of normative
development. The end point of this continuum may be either the
143. Principles to Combat Corruption in Africa, supra note 49, at principles 15 and
16.
144. Id. at principle 18.
145. See Toope, supra note 57, at 198.
146. See InternationalLaw and Constructivism, supra note 110, at 51.
147. It is noteworthy that within a period of three years (1997-2000), the number of
African countries that endorsed the principles increased from eleven to twenty-three. See
Collaboration to Combat Corruption (February 26-7, 2001), available at http://www.gcacma.org/ecorrup.htm#0201 (last visited Mar. 19, 2002).
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rules or, the adoption of a treaty as envisaged by the negotiators of the
Principles.
Having said that, it must be emphasized that the adoption of a
regional anti-corruption treaty has obvious advantages for Africa and
should be the objective of regional cooperation in this area. A treaty
will permit the express criminalization of corruption, especially in
international business transactions and development assistance. In
this respect, it could form the basis not only of the international
responsibility of states, but also of personal criminal responsibility of
individuals and corporations. Secondly, a treaty could make provision
for regional and international cooperation in the fight against
corruption. Provisions relating to mutual legal assistance in the
investigation and prosecution of offenders, as well as extradition of
criminals, could all be the subject of an international agreement
between states. Furthermore, a regional treaty could make provision
for confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds of corruption; especially in
situations where such proceeds or their beneficiaries are located in
other jurisdictions. Such treaty provisions would complement the fight
against corruption at the national level. For example, despite its
relative success in fighting corruption locally, the Government of
Botswana has encountered difficulty in corruption cases where the
subject matter of the
crime (either the criminal or the funds) is located
148
outside its borders.
Provisions in an anti-corruption convention could also be a
stimulus for African governments to put in place within their domestic
legal systems, foundational elements of a viable anti-corruption
environment such as provisions for civil society participation, a free
press, an independent judiciary, and the protection of sources of
corruption information. Moreover, the adoption of a treaty will perform
signaling functions to national public officials, international investors,
and the general public that African states have both the political will
and the legal muscle to stamp out corruption in Africa, and thus
contribute to the development an 'anti-corruption sensibility' in the
continent.

148. See GCA, supra note 10, at 22.

